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Executive Summary
We have analyzed the likely impact of adoption of Election Day 
Registration (EDR) by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.1 
Consistent with existing research on the impact of EDR in other 
circumstances, we find that EDR would likely lead to substantial 
increases in voter turnout. We are able to offer the following esti-
mates of increases in turnout for Massachusetts, and for specific 
groups of eligible voters under EDR:2
Overall turnout could go up by 4.9 percent.
Turnout among those aged 18 to 25 could 
increase by 9.7 percent.
Turnout for those who have moved in the last 
six months could increase by 7.9 percent.
Turnout for African Americans could increase 
by 5.6 percent.
Turnout among the poorest citizens could 
increase by 5.6 percent; turnout among the 
richest of citizens would likely increase by 
only 3.4 percent.
Introduction
The purpose of voter registration in the United States is to make 
sure that only eligible citizens vote. Voter registration also provides 
election officials with convenient lists they can use to notify voters 
about upcoming elections, as well as other information about elec-
tions and voting. Lastly, when individuals enter a polling place, a 
voter registration list gives poll workers the information they need 
to authenticate voters before they cast ballots.
At the same time, the process of voter registration imposes costs 
on voters, and these costs have been shown in many research studies 
to serve as barriers to many potential voters.3 In Massachusetts, 
eligible citizens have to register to vote at least 20 days before major 
elections.4 For some eligible citizens, especially those who have 
moved recently, requiring registration before election day might 
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2make it very difficult for them to cast a ballot in an election. Given that non-registered, but otherwise eligible citi-
zens are not on the lists that election officials or groups use to mobilize voters in elections, some non-registered 
eligible citizens may not be aware of an upcoming election or about how and when they can register to vote.
The costs associated with voter registration have been the focus of significant federal legislation, in the last few 
decades. With the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Congress required that states provide voter 
registration forms in places where state residents register their motor vehicles, and in other state offices like public 
assistance offices. The NVRA also called for mail-in voter registration. More recently, the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (HAVA) attempted to significantly improve voter registration practices across the nation by requiring states 
to develop computerized, statewide voter registries. HAVA also directed all states to adopt provisional or “fail-safe” 
voting.
Six states currently have substantial experience with allowing eligible citizens to register to vote on Election Day: 
Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.5 Iowa, Montana and North Carolina only 
recently adopted EDR or similar procedures. The six original EDR states have shown that Election Day Registration 
is an effective way to increase voter participation without complicating election administration or leading to 
increased voter fraud. Research regarding the experiences of these other six states has shown that:
Voter participation is somewhere between 3 and 6 percentage points higher than were 
EDR not used in those states; 
Citizens who have recently moved or are younger find it easier to register and vote; 
Election administration, when EDR is thoughtfully implemented, can be improved and 
EDR does not undermine the Election Day experience of poll workers or voters; and,
There is no evidence that the prospects for election fraud are increased.6 
Thus, based on the previous experience of these states, research we have earlier done on these experiences, other 
academic studies on voter participation and Election Day Registration, and new research that we present below, 
we believe that if appropriately implemented, Massachusetts will have a positive experience with Election Day 
Registration.7 In particular, we show below that both voter registration and turnout would increase once Election 
Day Registration is implemented in Massachusetts: we estimate that voter turnout could increase by almost 5 
percent.  Having more voters on the rolls will improve election administration, and give election officials throughout 
the state better information when they go to contact voters about upcoming elections and provide them with infor-
mation about those upcoming elections. And increasing voter participation should lead to a stronger democracy 
and a strengthened civic culture in Massachusetts.
EDR, Registration and Turnout
Determining a voter’s eligibility before allowing them to cast a vote has a long history in the United States. Studies 
of early American political history have shown that eligibility was determined by party observers at the polling 
places, who could challenge a voter’s ability to participate in an election.8 Pre-election voter registration practices 
began early in American history, but became widespread in the decades after the Civil War.9 In some states voter 
registration requirements were part of an array of measures, including poll taxes and literacy tests, that were used to 
disenfranchise segments of the potential electorate, including immigrants, the poor, and minorities. Early registra-
tion practices were themselves often quite restrictive, such as requiring annual or periodic, in-person registration at 
a county office during weekday business hours.10 
Liberalization of voter registration laws began with the civil rights movement, culminating in the passage of the 
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3Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The VRA eliminated many of the systematic barriers that made registration and 
voting difficult for poor and minority voters, and empowered the federal government to oversee the elimination of 
voting restrictions. Many states substantially reformed their registration and voting procedures after passage of the 
VRA.
But even with these reforms in some states, many other states continued to use restrictive registration prac-
tices after the passage of the VRA. A patchwork quilt of registration practices developed in many states and across 
the nation as many local election officials had substantial discretion over registration and voting procedures. And 
research by scholars showed that many voting and registration practices, particularly the practice of requiring 
registration well in advance of Election Day, substantially reduced voter turnout.11 This led to the enactment of 
the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), through which Congress sought to simplify the registration 
process and to improve the integrity of voter registries. Key to the NVRA was an expansion of avenues by which a 
citizen could register to vote, including registration by mail, at departments of motor vehicles, and in state public 
assistance offices. The NVRA also promulgated new rules regarding procedures for the removal of voters from the 
registration rolls. 
More recently, problems in the 2000 presidential election led to additional federal efforts to reform the voter 
registration process. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) directed that states develop a “centralized, interac-
tive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level” (Section 
303(a)(1)(B)). HAVA also required that states implement “fail-safe”, or provisional voting procedures, if they did 
not already have them, so that otherwise eligible citizens could cast a provisional ballot rather than be disenfran-
chised due to the omission of their names from the voter registry.
Six states had Election Day Registration in place when HAVA was enacted. Generally speaking, states with EDR 
have higher rates of voter registration and turnout than do states that do not have EDR. Based on data collected by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2004 states with EDR reported registration rates of 86.4 percent, while states without 
EDR had reported registration rates of only 79.1 percent.12 These numbers are consistent with data from previous 
elections: states with EDR have consistently had higher registration rates.13 And EDR states had demonstrably 
higher levels of voter turnout in 2004. According to the official voting statistics reported by secretaries of state, and 
the U.S. Census Bureau estimates of state population, EDR states had a voter turnout rate of 70.3 percent in 2004, 
while non-EDR states had a turnout rate of only 54.7 percent.14
Were Massachusetts to implement Election Day Registration, voter participation could increase substantially 
in a presidential election year like 2004 or 2008. Furthermore, voter participation might increase strongly among 
sectors of the population that typically turnout at lower rates, such as newly relocated eligible citizens or young 
voters, as they are the types of voters that previous research has shown are helped by EDR.
EDR in Massachusetts
Massachusetts ranked 21st in the nation in voter turnout in 2004.15 59.1 percent of the voting age population cast 
a ballot in the 2004 general election; 84.9 percent of Massachussetts citizens reported being registered.16 To estimate 
the potential impact of EDR, we turn to data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and use a methodology that we have employed in past research on voter turnout, discussed below in the Technical 
Appendix. In summary, we estimate statistical models predicting whether individual respondents in the 2004 CPS 
report being registered and whether they voted. In this estimation we control for many factors, including the voter 
registration process in the state. We control for the respondents’ age and level of education, whether or not respon-
dents have moved recently, their ethnic background, and whether or not they are native-born citizens or have been 
4recently naturalized. We then used these estimates to simulate the impact of Massachusetts having used EDR in the 
2004 election.17 
Estimates of the potential effect on voter turnout had Election Day Registration been in effect in Massachusetts in 
the 2004 election are provided in Table 1.17 First, we see that our analysis predicts that Massachusetts’ turnout would 
increase under EDR. Most importantly, our analysis predicts a 4.9 percent increase in voter turnout if Massachusetts 
moves to EDR. 
We might also see other substantial increases in voter turnout for those who might be most affected by EDR:
Turnout among those aged 18 to 25 could increase by 9.7 percent.
Turnout for those who have moved in the last six months could increase by 7.9 percent.
Turnout for African Americans could increase by 5.6 percent.
Over 173,000 additional eligible voters who do not have college degrees could vote; 
53,000 new voters with college degrees could vote.
Conclusion
One of the more robust conclusions in the study of turnout for the last 35 years has been that making the regis-
tration and voting process easier will increase turnout among eligible voters.19 Our analysis of the impact of EDR in 
Massachusetts is merely another piece of evidence supporting this claim. By comparing voter turnout in states with 
EDR and states without EDR, we have estimated the impact EDR would have in Massachusetts. Adoption of EDR 
could raise turnout by almost 5 percent according to our estimates. And it could raise turnout substantially more 
among groups such as young voters, and voters who have moved in the period preceding the election. 
The trend in the United States has been to ease the barrier that registration places on voting by moving the dead-
line closer to election day. Moving to EDR would lower that hurdle for thousands of citizens in Massachusetts, and 
bring more participants into the democratic process.
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5Technical Appendix
To estimate the impact of EDR in Massachusetts, we analyzed individual survey data collected by the Census 
Bureau. Each month the Census Bureau surveys approximately 50,000 households in the Current Population Survey. 
In even numbered years the November survey includes a battery of questions asking respondents whether or not 
they were registered to vote, how they registered, and if they voted. The CPS is considered to be the “gold standard” 
of datasets for analyzing individual-level factors affecting turnout, and turnout across states. The Census Bureau has 
a higher response rate than any other survey and the sample size is large enough to draw statistically valid samples 
within a state. Whereas the typical media poll might have 1,500 respondents nationwide, the November 2004 CPS 
included 1105 respondents from Massachusetts. 
Our model incorporates factors that have been shown in extensive research on voter turnout to be correlated 
with an individual’s decision on whether or not to vote. We include categorical variables to indicate whether or 
not the person is in one of five age groups: 18 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 60, or 61 to 75. We include categorical 
variables for education, placing the respondent as having less than a high school degree, a high school degree, 
some college education, or a college degree and beyond. For annual family income, we include brackets of less 
than $20,000, between $20,000 and $40,000, between $40,000 and $60,000, and above $60,000. The respondent’s 
ethnicity is measured as white, black, or Latino. We also include variables indicating whether or not the respondent 
was a naturalized citizen, and if so, whether they had come to the United States within 10 years of the 2004 election 
or within 16 years of the 2004 election. 
Our model includes variables at the state level for the number of days before the election that registration closes 
and for the presence of a competitive election. Three categorical variables indicate the presence (or absence) of a 
senate, gubernatorial, or presidential race within the state that was decided by a margin of 5 percent or less. 
To be able to determine the impact of EDR on particular groups of the population, and because we expect that 
EDR will have larger effects on those who have the most difficulty meeting the burden of pre-election registra-
tion, we include interaction terms between the availability of EDR and the respondent’s age, education and income; 
whether or not the respondent had moved previously; and whether the respondent was a native-born citizen or a 
naturalized citizen (and if so, whether recently immigrated or not).
Given these specifications, we estimated the model on all respondents in the CPS. Doing this provided estimates 
of the model parameters. We then computed the predicted probability of each respondent in the Massachusetts 
sample voting under current legal conditions—that is, the state’s requirement that voters register well before 
Election Day. We also compute the probability of each respondent in the sample in Massachusetts voting under the 
counterfactual condition that Massachusetts had Election Day Registration. By aggregating those predicted prob-
abilities over different sub-groups of interest, we are then able to estimate the impact of EDR on any sub-group 
within the population, or we can estimate the impact of EDR on all voting age persons in Massachusetts. Again, we 
assume that the impact of EDR in Massachusetts will closely resemble the impact of EDR experienced elsewhere.
6Persons with grade school education
Table 1: Simulated 2004 Turnout Increases In Massachusetts under EDR
Entire State
Percentage Increase Additional Votes
4.9
7.9
9.7
226,015
27,211
61,402
Persons who have moved in the last 6 months
Persons Age  18 - 25
5.2
6.1
4.5
4.2
32,906
88,606
51,614
52,889
Grade school education
High school graduates
Some college
College graduates
5.4 43,641Persons Age  26 - 35
3.8 30,495Persons Age  36 - 45
3.9 47,127Persons Age  46 - 60
3.8 27,926Persons Age  61 - 75
3.5 15,422 Age  76 - 90
African American 5.6
5.5
4.7
  14,338
11,984
190,706
Latinos
Whites
5.6 16,921Naturalized Citizens
5.6 43,091Lower Income ($0 - $20,000 household income)
7.8 96,000Middle Income ($20,000 - $40,000)
3.2 36,395Upper Income ($40,000 - $60,000)
3.4 50,529Top Income ($60,000 and above)
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